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ABSTRACT 
Despite potential advantages of rights-based management over competitive fisheries, there has been 
significant political resistance to rights-based management from many fishermen, which has slowed the 
adoption of rights-based management.  This paper explores the concept of voluntary transitions to rights-
based management, under which fishermen may choose between an allocated fishery (with individual or 
group quotas) or a competitive fishery, and the relative distribution of the total quota between the 
allocated and competitive fishery depends upon how many fishermen choose to participate in each.   
Voluntary transitions are possible if (a) access has already been limited; and (b) it is possible to divide the 
fishery—for example temporally or spatially—into two fisheries managed under different rules.  By 
allocating disproportionately more fish to the competitive fishery, voluntary transitions may become a 
“win-win” approach under which both groups become better off, while over time an increasing proportion 
of fishermen choose to join the allocated fishery. This paper uses an experimental approach, in which 
subjects simulate actual fishing, to test and demonstrate the potential of voluntary transitions from 
competitive to rights-based fishing.  The paper also discusses the Alaska Chignik salmon cooperative, an 
example of a voluntary transition from competitive to rights-based fishing.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Even when entry is limited, significant rent dissipation may occur in competitive fisheries (Wilen 2004).  
Competition between fishermen may result in increased costs (as participants spend more to try to 
increase their share of the catch) as well as reduced product value (due to poorer handling, lower 
recovery, and shorter seasons).   Figures 1 illustrates two mechanisms by which rent dissipation occurs in 
Alaska’s Bristol Bay drift gillnet salmon fishery. 
 
Rights-based fisheries management offers significant potential economic advantages over competitive 
fisheries.  These advantages include lower capital costs, lower operating costs, more efficient use of 
capital, improved utilization, and improve potential to increase market value by meeting market demands 
for product quality, product variety, and timing of supply. 
 
Despite potential advantages of rights-based management over competitive fisheries, there is often 
significant resistance to rights-based management from many fishermen.  This resistance has slowed or 
stopped the adoption of rights-based management in many fisheries (including the Alaska Bristol Bay 
salmon fishery). 
 
Why would some fishermen oppose rights-based management, which economists believe would make 
them better off?  There are many potential reasons, including: (1) Some fishermen may not understand the 
reasons for which economists believe rights-based management would make them better off; (2) Some 
fishermen may understand but not believe the reasons that economists believe rights-based management 
would make them better off (they may doubt that rights-based management will work in practice like in 
theory); and (3) Some fishermen may correctly perceive that rights-based management would not make 
them better off. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 1. Rent dissipation in Alaska’s Bristol Bay fishery:  capital stuffing (left) and the race for fish 
(right).  Photographs by Norm Van Vactor and Bart Eaton 
 
Why might some fishermen not be better off under rights-based management?   First, how fishermen will 
be affected by rights-based management depends critically on how rights are allocated.  A harvester 
earning profits in a competitive fishery will very rationally oppose rights-based management unless he 
expects to receive a sufficient allocation to earn equivalent or higher profits.  (Note that it is not true that 
no rents are earned in competitive fisheries; skilled fishermen can clearly earn significant rents even if 
less-skilled fishermen earn zero rents).  Secondly, fishermen who are risk-seeking have a chance to strike 
it big with a highly profitable season in a competitive fishery but no such chance in a rights-based fishery.  
Third, some fishermen enjoy fishing competitively (and have told the authors so).  These three reasons are 
not the only reasons; however they are particularly relevant to the subsequent discussion. 
 
Regardless of the reasons, significant numbers of fishermen oppose rights-based management.   
Opposition from fishermen has clearly slowed or stopped the adoption of rights-based management in 
many countries.  For example, in the United States, opposition to rights-based management was reflected 
in a Congressional moratorium on the establishment of new individual quota systems in federally 
managed fisheries between 1996 and 2002.   
 
If the potential benefits of rights-based management approaches envisioned by economists are to be 
realized, it is important consider approaches to introducing rights-based management that might 
encounter less resistance from fishermen.  In this paper, we discuss one such approach:  voluntary 
transition to rights-based management. 
 
VOLUNTARY TRANSITION TO RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we define the concept of “voluntary transition to rights-based 
management” as having these four characteristics:  
 
•  The competitive fishery must be limited entry—or entry must be limited as an initial step. 
 IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
  3
•  The fishery is divided into two separate fisheries, each of which is allocated a separate aggregate 
share of the total quota.  One of these is a rights-based fishery, in which harvesters fish for 
individual or group quotas.  The other is a competitive fishery, in which harvesters compete in 
catching the total quota.  The two fisheries may be divided temporally (fishing occurs at different 
times), spatially (fishing occurs in different areas), or in some other way. 
 
•  Harvesters may choose annually whether to participate in the rights-based fishery or the 
competitive fishery. 
 
•  The annual aggregate quotas of the two fisheries depend upon the number of harvesters choosing 
to participate in each fishery 
 
The basic rationale for voluntary transition is as follows.  The rights-based fishery generates higher rents 
per fish than the original competitive fishery.  Even if those harvesters who choose the rights-based 
fishery are given a lower average allocation than their average harvests in the original fishery, they can 
earn higher rents per fish—making them better off.  By giving the rights-based fishery a lower per capita 
allocation, harvesters who choose the competitive fishery can also be given a higher average allocation 
than they would have received in the original competitive fishery—making them also better off.  Thus 
both the fishermen that choose the rights-based fishery and the competitive fishery can be better off—a 
“win-win” opportunity. 
 
As an example, assume that there are 100 permit holders, and that R is .5, so that harvesters choosing the 
quota fishery receive only half the average allocation as harvesters choosing the competitive fishery.  As 
illustrated in Figure 3, that the more harvesters who choose the quota fishery, the higher the average 
allocation which is possible in both fisheries. The blue (lower) line represents the average catch share of a 
quota permit, while the red (upper) curve represents the average catch share of a competitive permit. 
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Figure 2 
 
Assume next that 70% of potential profits are dissipated in competitive fishing, that 0% of potential 
profits are dissipated in quota fishing, and that harvesters would average $100 in profits if all fish were 
harvested in a quota fishery.   As shown in Figure 4, if harvesters who choose the quota fishery earn 
higher profits than harvesters who choose the competitive fishery, despite their lower catch allocations, 
because they dissipate fewer profits.  This creates an incentive over time for harvesters to switch from the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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competitive fishery to the quota fishery.  As they do so, average profits increase for both fisheries—and 
for the combined fisheries. 
 
Average Catch Shares and Profits
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Figure 3 
 
EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
 
To demonstrate and test the concept of a voluntary transition to rights-based management, we used an 
experimental methodology which we have been using for a variety of teaching and research applications 
at the University of Alaska Anchorage Experimental Economics Laboratory.  In these experiments, 
participants simulate a fishery by actually “fishing”—albeit in a very simple way.  In this fishery, the 
“fish” are beans in a large bowl on a table, and the “gear” options consist of measuring scoops of varying 
sizes.  Harvesters “fish” by using the scoops to scoop fish out of the bowl into plastic pitchers on the 
floor. 
 
   
Figure 4:  Supplies for the Fishing Experiment 
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We have conducted numerous experiments with eight student subjects.  Initially all subjects fish in a 
“competitive” fishery from one bowl, which contains 20 cups of beans (an average of 2.5 cups per 
subject).  Subjects earn “revenues” of $1 per cup of beans which they “harvested.”  To fish, subjects need 
to purchase “gear” (scoops).  They may choose one of seven scoops ranging in size from 1/8 cup to 1 cup.  
The rental cost of the scoop is proportional to the size of the scoop, at $4.375 per cup of scoop size.  
Following the experiment, the subjects are paid real dollars proportional to the “profits” they earn in the 
experiment.    
 
Note that given these rules, the most efficient gear choice would be for each of the eight subjects to use 
the lowest-cost 1/8 cup scoop, for a total cost of $4.375, resulting in total profit of $20.00 – $4.375, or 
$15.125. (This excludes the option of having only one subject use one 1/8 cup scoop and sharing the 
profit, which we do not invite or allow.) 
 
 
Figure 5:  Experimental subjects choosing gear prior to “fishing” competitively 
 
At the start of the “season,” each subject chooses a single scoop to fish with. The fishery remains “open” 
until all the beans are harvested.   
 
Fishing under these rules, subjects regularly exhibit “competitive” behavior characteristic of a classic 
derby fishery.  They choose scoop sizes much larger than 1/8 cup, realizing (correctly) that those with 
larger scoops capture a much larger share of the harvest.  This adds to total costs without adding to total 
revenues.  They fish aggressively to scoop beans out of the bowl as fast as they can.  In doing so, they 
spill a significant share of the total harvest while tossing beans into their pitchers.  As a result, a large 
share of the potential profits are dissipated, and most subjects earn low or no profits. 
 
When we replace the competitive fishery with a “quota” fishery, under which each subject receives an 
individual quota which he may harvest at his own pace, we observe dramatic changes in the “fishery.” 
After one or two seasons (not all subjects catch on immediately), subjects always choose the smallest and 
cheapest 1/8 cup scoop. They “fish” their quotas slowly and carefully and spill almost no beans. 
 
We are planning to report elsewhere on these contrasting fishing behaviors under competitive and quota 
management, as well as a variety of other insights related to heterogeneity in fishing skill and the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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evolution of gear choices over time.  In the following discussion, we report only on the application of this 
experimental methodology to demonstrate and test the concept of a voluntary transition to rights-based 
management. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
 
We conducted eight experiments, with eight subjects per experiment.  In each experiment, subjects fished 
sixteen seasons (rounds), as summarized in Table 1. 
 
Rounds 
Scoop choice 
options 
Competitive or 
quota? Purpose 
1-3  Mandatory ¼ cup  Competitive  Test subjects’ relative “skill” 
4-7  Any scoop  Competitive  Observe cup choices, harvests and profits when 
all subjects fish competitively 
8-16 Any  scoop  Subjects  may 
choose between 
competitive and 
quota fishery 
Observe fishery choices 
Observe cup choices, harvest and profits in both 
fisheries 
Table 1 
 
In Rounds 1-3, all subjects fished competitively using a mandatory ¼ cup scoop.  The purpose of these 
first three seasons was to let subjects gain familiarity with fishing, and to test their relative “skill” in 
fishing competitively.  (We plan to report elsewhere on interesting differences which we observed in 
fishing skill and their relationship to gear choices and fishery choices in subsequent rounds.) 
 
In Rounds 4-7, subjects competitively using whatever scoop they chose.  During these four rounds, they 
exhibited classic characteristics of competitive fishing as described above.  After Round 7 we offered 
subjects the following choice: 
 
“We will now divide the beans into two separate bowls.  Before each round, you must 
decide the bowl from which you want to harvest. The amount of beans in each bowl will 
depend upon how many people choose to harvest from each bowl.  The beans will be 
divided such that Bowl 1 always has 1¼*  times as many beans per person as Bowl 2.  
 
The rules for harvesting at each bowl are also different.  In Bowl #1 the rules will be 
exactly the same as the previous stage.  The only differences may be the number of people 
harvesting from this bowl and the amount of beans in the bowl. 
 
In Bowl #2, the rules will be different.  Each person who harvests from Bowl #2 will be 
assigned a personal harvest quota.  If you choose to harvest from Bowl #2, your harvest 
is limited to your personal quota; you may not harvest more than your personal quota“ 
 
*This proportion, equal to 1/R as defined above, varied between treatments. 
 
In the remaining nine rounds (8-16) we observed how many subjects chose each fishery, and their gear 
choices, fishing behavior and profits in each fishery.   
 
We conducted the experiment with two treatments with different values of R, as summarized in Table 2.  
Note that in treatment X, subjects choosing the competitive fishery received only slightly higher average IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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allocations.  In contrast, in treatment X, subjects choosing the competitive fishery received much higher 
average allocations. 
 
Treatment 
Number of 
experiments 
Ratio of beans per subject 
in Bowl 1 (competitive fishery) 
to beans per subject 
in Bowl 2 (quota fishery)  R 
X 4  1.25  .8 
Y 4  2.5  .4 
Table 2 
 
We hypothesized that we would observe the following. 
 
•  Given the option to choose between a competitive fishery and a quota fishery, some but not all 
subjects will choose the quota fishery 
 
•  Over time, the number of subjects choosing the quota fishery will increase  
 
•  Average gear use (harvest cost) will be lower in both the quota and the competitive fishery than 
in a competitive-only fisher 
 
•  Average profits will be higher in both the quota and the competitive fishery than in a competitive-
only fishery 
 
•  These hypotheses will hold even for values of R significantly less than 1 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Below, we briefly summarize the experimental results, using graphs which show subjects choices by 
period (round or season), averaged over the four experiments in each treatment.  Here we only summarize 
key findings of interest.  We plan to report on these findings in greater detail elsewhere. 
 
We hypothesized that “Given the option to choose between a competitive fishery and a quota fishery, 
some but not all subjects will choose the quota fishery” and “Over time, the number of subjects choosing 
the quota fishery will increase.”  As shown in Figure 5, in both treatments some subjects chose the quota 
fishery.  In Treatment X (with higher R of .8) the number of subjects choosing the quota fishery increased 
over time—reflecting the fact that average profits were higher for the quota fishery.  
 
In contrast, in Treatment Y (with much lower R of .4) the number of subjects choosing the quota fishery 
did not increase over time.  What is striking, however, is that even with the expectation of average 
harvests of only 40% of those for the competitive fishery, an average of between 2 and 4 subjects 
nevertheless chose to fish in the quota fishery. 
 
We hypothesized that “Average gear use (harvest cost) will be lower in both the quota and the 
competitive fishery than in a competitive-only fishery.”  This occurred for both the higher R fishery 
(Figure 7) and the lower R fishery (Figure 8).  Not only was the quota fishery more efficient, but with 
fewer participants there was also less competitive pressure to choose a large scoop size in the competitive 
fishery.  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 6 
 
Average Scoop Size by Period
Treatment X (R = .8)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
period
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
(
c
u
p
s
)
Competive,
mandatory 1/4
cup scoop
Competitive,
optional scoop
size
Competitive bowl
Average, both
bowls
Quota bowl
 
Figure 7 
 
Average Scoop Size by Period
Treatment Y (R = .4)
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We hypothesized that “Average profits will be higher in both the quota and the competitive fishery than 
in a competitive-only fishery.”  This was the case for both the higher R fishery (Figure 9) and the lower R 
fishery (Figure 10).   
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Figure 9 
 
 
Average Earnings by Period
Treatment Y (R = .4)
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Figure 10 
 
 
Finally, we hypothesized that “these hypotheses will hold even for values of R significantly less than 1”—
as they did. 
 
In summary, the experimental results supported our hypothesis that even with significantly lower 
allocations per harvester, at least some subjects chose the option to fish in a non-competitive allocated IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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fishery—thus reducing total costs in the fishery and increasing total profits, not only for those who chose 
the allocated fishery but also for those who continued to fish competitively. 
 
THE ALASKA CHIGNIK SALMON COOPERATIVE 
 
The Alaska Chignik salmon cooperative represents and interesting and instructive example of an actual 
voluntary transition to rights-based management (Knapp 2008).  The Chignik salmon fishery is a major 
Alaska sockeye salmon fishery with approximately 100 limited entry permit holders.  The Chignik fishery 
provides ideal conditions for cooperative salmon fishing because all fish return through a protected 
lagoon to a single river.   
 
Chignik permit holders had previous experience with cooperative fishing during strikes, but could not 
reach agreement on a 100% voluntary cooperative or imposition by managers of a mandatory cooperative.  
In order for those fishermen who wished to so to be able to fish cooperatively, co-op advocates proposed 
that the Board of Fisheries allocate a share of the total harvest to a voluntary cooperative, with the 
allocation to be determined based on the number of permit holders joining.  The co-op and the 
“independent” fleet (permit holders who didn’t join the co-op) would fish is separate, sequential fishery 
openings.  The proposal was implemented for four years until it was ended by Alaska Supreme Court 
decision that it violated a state requirement that limited entry permit holders be onboard when their 
permits are fished. 
 
In each year, the majority of permit holders jointed the co-op despite the fact that it received a lower 
average allocation per permit holder (Table 3). 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005
50 or fewer
51-84
85 or more
Co-op 77 77 87 76
Independent 22 24 13 23
Total 99 101 100 99
Co-op 69.3% 69.3% 87.0% 68.4%
Independent 30.7% 30.7% 13.0% 31.6%
Co-op 0.90% 0.90% 1.00% 0.90%
Independent 1.40% 1.28% 1.00% 1.37%
Allocation 
formula if total Co-
op members  is:
No co-op allocation
0.90% per member*
1.00% per member**
Source: Knapp, 2008.  Note:  Table excludes one independent permit holder who did not fish in 2002.   *For 
2004 and 2005, the formula was 0.95% per co-op member if the number of members was between 80 and 84.  
**The table assumes 100 permit holders. Technically the allocation was "one prorated share" per member if 
the Co-op had 85 or more members. 
Number of 
permits holders
Allocation of 
sockeye harvest
Allocation per 
permit
 
Table 3:  Chignik co-op and independent fleet allocations 
 
The estimated cost savings attributable to the co-op were substantial.  While savings were most apparent 
for the co-op (Table 4), they also occurred for the independent fleet, which was able to catch its allocation 
in far fewer days (as permit holders were competing with far fewer other vessels on the fishing grounds). 
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2002 2003 2004
$4,655 $5,738 $3,596
85 85 85
19 19 19
22 24 13
44 42 53
52% 49% 62%
Insurance, maintenance & fuel $1,232 $1,176 $1,484
Crew and groceries $920 $1,118 $750
Insurance, maintenance & fuel 26% 20% 41%
Crew and groceries 20% 19% 21%
Number of boats which fished for the Co-op
Number of Co-op boats which fished
Fishery ex-vessel value ($000)
Assumed number of boats which would have fished a competitive fishery
Source:  Knapp (2008).  Note:  Assumes average costs of $28,000 per boat for insurance, maintenance and 
fuel and average cost of $3500 per boat for groceries.  Crew cost savings estimates assume that crew would 
have been paid a crew share of 30% of ex-vessel value net of 6% fish taxes in a competitive fishery, and 
that the decline in crew costs during the co-op years would have been proportional to the decline in vessels 
fishing--so that that crew would not have been paid more for catching more fish. 
Cost savings ($000)
Cost savings as % of 
ex-vessel value
Reduction in boats attributable to Co-op
% reduction in boats attributable to Co-op
 
 
Table 4:  Rough estimates of the potential magnitude of cost savings attributable to the Chignik co-op 
 
Thus the Chignik co-op demonstrated that (1) an allocation to a voluntary rights-based fishery can 
provide an effective mechanism for achieving rights-based management and significant economic 
benefits, and (2) Sequential fishing is a relatively simple and efficient way of allocating a voluntary 
rights-based fishery organization.  
  
However, the Chignik co-op also demonstrated some of the practical difficulties in voluntary approaches 
to rights-based fishing.  One clear difficulty is that deriving a formula for allocating to a voluntary rights-
based fishery is not easy. It is impossible to devise a “fair” allocation formula which will satisfy 
everyone.  The Chignik co-op provided an example of the phenomenon—familiar to parents of multiple 
children—that treating two groups differently may result in neither group feeling satisfied.  Both co-op 
and independent fishermen felt they were treated unfairly by the allocation formula and other aspects of 
the co-op.  Arguments over these issues gave rise to new arguments over what people had said or how 
they had said it, dividing permit holders, communities and families. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Theory, experimental evidence and practical experience all suggest that offering fishermen a 
choice between participating in a rights-based fishery and continuing to fish competitively may 
be an effective approach to facilitate transition to rights-based fishing.  Voluntary transitions may 
become a “win-win” approach under which both groups become better off. 
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